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Abstract 
China has become the world’s third largest outward investor, behind the United States and Japan. 
A growing body of literature suggests that China’s regulatory framework for outward foreign 
direct investment (OFDI) is a determinant of the country’s rising OFDI. This paper presents a 
holistic review of that framework, including some possibilities for its improvement. Overall, 
China’s framework serves two objectives: to help Chinese firms become more competitive 
internationally and to assist the country in its development effort. In pursuing these objectives, the 
regulatory framework has moved from restricting, to facilitating, to supporting, to encouraging 
OFDI; but there are still strong elements of administrative control that make it cumbersome. 
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) seem to benefit particularly from the current framework when 
internationalizing through FDI. 
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1. Introduction 
For the first time ever, in 2012 China became the world’s third largest outward investor, 
with US$84 billion outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) flows, following the 
United States (US$329 billion) and Japan (US$123 billion) (United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development [UNCTAD] 2013a, 6, 213). A growing literature suggests 
that China’s regulatory framework for OFDI, notably government policies, laws and 
regulations, is a determinant of the country’s growing investment outflows (see, e.g., 
Buckley et al. 2008; Cui and Jiang 2012; Luo, Xue, and Han 2010). However, few efforts 
have been made so far to provide a holistic picture of this framework in the context of the 
country’s ‘go out’ strategy.1 This paper reviews the country’s major policies, laws, and 
regulations that relate to OFDI to discuss why and how the government is helping 
Chinese firms to invest abroad. 
2. The Regulatory Framework: from Restricting, to Facilitating, to Supporting, 
to Encouraging OFDI 
The overall objective of China’s current regulatory framework for OFDI is twofold. First, 
the framework seeks to facilitate and support OFDI in order to nurture globally 
competitive Chinese firms. This objective, in turn, is the result of an interplay of two 
factors. The first factor is the government’s desire to have internationally competitive 
firms whose portfolio of locational assets provides better access to markets and resources 
(natural, strategic and other resources) and which itself becomes a source of corporate 
competitiveness. The second factor is the pressure on government by firms that seek to 
internationalize in response to domestic and international competition. Formal fora in  
which firms can make themselves heard and exercise pressure on government policies 
include the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference (CPCCC). For instance, during the 2013 NPC and CPCCC 
sessions, a Senior Vice President of Midea Group called for more reform and policy 
innovation to provide broader support (e.g., finance, technology, fiscal policy, human 
resource development) for Chinese companies going abroad (‘Outward FDI chapter’ 
2013). Other major representatives of the business elite such as Dongsheng Li, President 
of TCL, and Shufu Li, President of Zhejiang Geely Group, also encouraged the 
government to liberalize its OFDI review process and provide more resources and 
information to support OFDI (‘Outward FDI chapter’ 2013). Deming Chen, the Minister 
of Commerce at the time, responded that China’s approval process has thus far focused 
only on the direction and amount of OFDI, but would inevitably become less 
cumbersome (‘Outward FDI chapter’ 2013). 
                                                 
1
 Although the expression ‘go out’ policy is usually used as the official translation of 走出去战略 
(see, e.g., Government of China [2006]), ‘going out’, ‘go abroad’, ‘going abroad’, ‘step 
out’, and ‘stepping out’ are sometimes used interchangeably in the literature. 
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Second, China’s institutional framework for OFDI especially seeks to encourage 
OFDI that can contribute most to the country’s national development. It does this by 
selectively supporting particular industries and activities in their internationalization 
through FDI. For the national economy, broadening the scope and geography of 
investment means more options for economic (re)structuring (e.g., value-chain upgrading 
and integration) and resource allocation optimization (e.g., reducing the cost of raw 
materials and labor); OFDI thus provides more resources and opportunities for economic 
growth (Chen 2009). In addition, OFDI provides access to tangible and intangible 
resources that are of direct relevance to China’s development effort, beginning with raw 
materials but also including technology, brand names etcetera. This development 
objective is reflected in the fact that OFDI is encouraged by the government through 
various instruments (discussed below) in particular industries and activities that are of 
special importance to the development effort.  
These two objectives evolved from a series of previous government 
pronouncements and policy documents. Most important among them was the 
formalization, during the Third Plenum of the Ninth National People’s Congress in 
March 2000 (Yu and Jiao 2011), of the country’s ‘go out’ strategy in the 10th Five-Year 
Plan on Economic and Social Development (hereafter the 10th Five-Year Plan) (NPC 
2001). The 10th Five-Year Plan explained the strategy as a means to ‘to encourage OFDI 
into areas where China has competitive advantages, and to expand the scope, channels 
and modes of international economic and technological cooperation’ (NPC 2001).  
As part of the 10th Five-Year Plan, the 10th Five-Year Plan on Inward and 
Outward FDI (hereafter the 10th FDI Five-Year Plan) was released by the then State 
Planning Commission (SPC) on 24 December 2001. The latter document more explicitly 
elaborated that the objective of the ‘go out’ strategy was to: actively and stably expand 
investment overseas; facilitate strategic investment by capable firms in natural resources 
exploration and other areas in which Chinese firms hold a comparative advantage; and  
develop internationally competitive multinational enterprises (MNEs) (NDRC 2001). By 
this time, both purposes discussed earlier – i.e., to facilitate Chinese OFDI in order to 
nurture the international competitiveness of Chinese firms, and to use OFDI for China’s 
overall development – had been clearly formulated. 
These two objectives were elaborated on again in a number of subsequent policy 
documents guiding OFDI. The most general and authoritative guiding policy was set out 
in the State Council’s Opinions on Encouraging and Guiding Foreign Investment and 
Cooperation by Chinese Enterprises (hereafter the 2006 Opinions) (State Council 2006). 
It reiterated the objectives of the country’s OFDI strategy, viz. to:  
• more effectively utilize two types of resources and two markets (i.e., domestic 
and international);  
• facilitate the structural adjustment of the economy;  
• enhance the international competitiveness of Chinese firms;  
• promote cooperation with OFDI partner countries; and  
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• promote the development of China (and that of the partner countries) (State 
Council 2006).  
These objectives were very similar to those specified in the Outward Investment 
Sector Direction Policy (hereafter the Sector Direction Policy) (NDRC et al. 2006), 
which was promulgated earlier in the same year and grouped industries into three 
categories into which Chinese OFDI is forbidden, permitted, and encouraged. The 
nuanced difference is, however, that the 2006 Opinions mentioned structural adjustment, 
which is an extension of domestic economic development via OFDI. Another document 
that elaborates on the overall direction of the country’s OFDI support is the Priority 
OFDI Projects for Credit Support (hereafter EXIM priorities) by the NDRC and The 
Export-Import Bank of China (EXIM) (2003, 2004). It sets out guidelines for credit 
support in order to direct competitive Chinese outward investors seeking natural and 
strategic resources and foreign markets. 
More recently, the country’s overall planning policy – the 12th Five-Year Plan on 
National Economic and Social Development (hereafter the 12th Five-Year Plan) – that  
guides all economic and social policies between 2011-2015 (Government of China 
2011a) has suggested the directions for future OFDI support. The 12th Five-Year Plan 
encompasses two documents that indicate clear directions for future OFDI support, viz.: 
the 12th Five-Year Plan on Industrial Reform and Upgrading (hereafter the 12th Industrial 
Five-Year Plan) (State Council 2011); and the 12th Five-Year Plan on Inward and 
Outward FDI (hereafter the 12th FDI Five-Year Plan) (NDRC 2012a).  
The first document, the 12th Industrial Five-Year Plan, laid out five priorities for 
industrial sectors that all have potential implications for OFDI:  
(1) the outsourcing of production to locations where domestic technologies are 
established and global demand is high;  
(2) the establishment of industrial parks overseas in regions where conditions are 
advantageous;  
(3) international exploration and cooperation projects in important energy and natural 
resources such as oil and gas, iron ore, uranium, copper, and alumininum, and the 
building of long-term, stable, safe, and diversified multi-channel supply systems 
for natural resources;  
(4) the construction of R&D centers in technology-intensive overseas locations and 
collaboration with foreign R&D institutions and innovative enterprises; and 
(5) comprehensive engineering projects by capable and capital-rich big corporations; 
M&As and greenfield investments; the international registration of intellectual 
property rights; the establishment of global marketing and sales networks and 
regional sales centers; and global resource configuration and value-chain 
integration (State Council 2011).  
Similarly, to a large extent (and consistent with earlier documents) the 12th FDI 
Five-Year Plan lays out the future development of the OFDI policy framework. It 
emphasizes the government’s role in promoting OFDI in three priority areas:   
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• supporting the active participation of Chinese firms in natural resource projects 
overseas in order to secure the sustainable, stable, economic, and safe supply of 
energy and natural resources;  
• accelerating the implementation of technological upgrading; and  
• effectively implementing the expansion into foreign markets (NDRC 2012a).  
The document explicitly states the government’s objective of enhancing the 
competitiveness and independence of Chinese outward investors, where 
‘competitiveness’ encompasses the development of capabilities in R&D, marketing, 
logistics, brand names, corporate social responsibility, as well as governance and 
managerial know-how (NDRC 2012a).  
The 12th FDI Five-Year Plan also encourages capable private enterprises, 
particularly small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), to engage in OFDI. The 
document suggests that the government’s efforts to promote private OFDI are the result 
of an interplay between the two forces mentioned earlier. First, there is the government’s 
emphasis on creating internationally competitive Chinese MNEs in general regardless of 
their ownership structure. Second, there is the growing voice of (and pressure by) rising 
investors in the private sector who are calling for improvements to the regulatory regime 
for OFDI (NDRC 2012a). 
The above documents together provide a comprehensive view of the 
government’s objectives regarding China’s OFDI, down to specific industries and 
activities, and they allow for anticipating the central government’s likely position on 
particular projects. For instance, building an R&D center (see EXIM Priorities and the 
12th FDI Five-Year Plan) as a joint venture with a local partner (see 12th Industrial Five-
Year Plan) in the pharmaceutical industry (see Sector Direction Policy) would fall into 
the category of projects perceived by the government as highly desirable. For this reason, 
it may receive faster administrative processing on the regulatory side. On the promotion 
side, it might qualify for government support on fiscal, financial, insurance, 
informational, and other matters.  
The next section discusses how the priorities identified above in turn inform the 
various laws and regulations that are meant to help Chinese firms in their OFDI. 
2.1. The Current Framework is Enabling – but Still Cumbersome 
The principal instruments that define the current OFDI framework governing non-
financial investments2 are:  
                                                 
2
 ‘Non-financial’ refers to all Chinese investors that do not belong to the banking, securities and 




• the Administrative Measures for Overseas Investment enacted by the Ministry of 
Commerce of China on 1 May 2009 (hereafter the MOFCOM 2009 Measures) 
(MOFCOM 2009);   
• the NDRC’s Interim Administrative Measures for Approving Investment Projects 
Overseas (hereafter the NDRC Interim Measures), enacted on 9 October 2004 
(NDRC 2004); together with   
• an array of measures supporting OFDI, notably the 2006 Opinions (State Council 
2006) and the provisions contained in the EXIM Priorities, the Sector Direction 
Policy, the 12th Industrial Five-Year Plan, and the 12th FDI Five-Year Plan.  
These instruments deal with two core areas: (1) instituting easier procedures for 
undertaking OFDI, thereby granting firms greater independence in their decision making; 
and (2) strengthening and clarifying the MOFCOM’s policies and services that relate to 
OFDI.  
The MOFCOM 2009 Measures also did a number of other things. First, they 
decentralized the authority to approve proposed foreign investments to local departments 
of commerce, except for a few strategically sensitive matters. Second, they simplified the 
MOFCOM’s approval procedures – there is now only one application form and no more 
than three business days for approval. Third, they allowed investors themselves to assess 
the feasibility of their proposed OFDI projects. Fourth, they provided that the MOFCOM 
would continue its role of negotiating bilateral and multilateral investment agreements, 
such as bilateral investment treaties (BITs). Lastly, they issued regulations regarding the 
way in which Chinese investors operate in their host countries.  
Similar to the MOFCOM, the NDRC is also in the process of simplifying its 
approval procedures. On 16 August 2012 the NDRC released the Exposure Draft (for 
Consultancy and Comments) of Approval Measures for Investment Projects Overseas 
(hereafter NDRC Exposure Draft) (NDRC 2012b). This document aims further to  
decentralize the approval process to sub-national offices. In other words, the current 
institutional framework for China’s OFDI is much more decentralized than in the past; 
moreover, the government actively encourages OFDI through a number of instruments.  
Going forward, Beijing aims further to liberalize OFDI regulations (‘Outward 
FDI chapter’ 2013) while embedding its approach to OFDI within a broader economic 
development strategy in both the regulatory and promotion sides. On the regulatory side, 
the most important governmental actor is the NDRC. As discussed earlier, the NDRC 
explicitly screens OFDI projects against China’s national economic development 
priorities (NDRC 2011). On the promotion side, there are a few major policy documents 
where the approach to OFDI can be seen to be embedded within a broader development 
strategy – in addition to the EXIM Priorities and the Sector Direction Policy discussed 
earlier, the other major documents here are the 12th Industrial Five-Year Plan and the 12th 
FDI Five-Year Plan. 
All non-financial companies, whether state-owned or private, need to receive 
approval from the NDRC and the MOFCOM (or their provincial-level offices) before 
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they can undertake an overseas direct investment project. Central state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) also need to be approved by the State-Owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC).3 A roadmap of China’s OFDI approval process is 
laid out in Table 1. 
                                                 
3
 There were a total of 115 SASAC-listed central SOEs as of 12 May 2013. The full list is 
available at http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n1226/n2425/index.html. 
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Approval Agencies and Processes 
The number of days for approval is provided if specified in the regulatory documents; 
"Approval" signifies that an approval is required, but the number of days for the approval processes is not specified; 
"Informed" signifies that no approval is needed but a report is required. 
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Approval for Non-Financial Companies 
Any Chinese enterprise in non-financial industries, including legal persons in the public 
sector, is allowed to invest abroad after approval by both the MOFCOM and the NDRC 
or their provincial equivalents (MOFCOM 2009; NDRC 2004, 2012b). Through the 
NDRC, Chinese investments exceeding US$300 million in natural resources or US$100 
million in other sectors need further approval by the State Council (NDRC 2012b). 
However, proposed OFDI activities that meet certain criteria for sensitivity are expressly 
forbidden by the MOFCOM. An investment is prohibited if it would:  
• endanger the sovereignty, national security and social public interests of China, or 
would violate Chinese laws and regulations;  
• jeopardize bilateral diplomatic relationships;  
• violate bilateral agreements; or  
•
 involve technologies and products that are embargoed for export (MOFCOM 
2009).  
Beyond these overarching provisions, the MOFCOM and the NDRC have their 
own approval processes, summarized in Table 1 above and discussed separately below. 
MOFCOM Approval Processes 
The MOFCOM 2009 Measures require an investor to obtain a Certificate of 
Enterprise/Organization Investment Abroad (hereafter the Certificate) 5  from the 
MOFCOM after finalizing an OFDI proposal. After obtaining the Certificate, the investor 
can proceed to buy foreign exchange and obtain customs clearance and other services 
(such as commercial consulate services). The Certificate becomes invalid if the OFDI 
activities set out in the proposal do not actually begin within two years after the approval 
(MOFCOM 2009). 
Not all proposed OFDI projects must be submitted to the central office of the 
MOFCOM for approval. The following investments, however, do need to be approved by 
the central office in order to obtain the requisite Certificate to proceed (Table 1): any 
projects conducted by central SOEs, regardless of the investment size; any project by 
other firms in natural resources; and any project where the committed investment by a 
Chinese investor is over US$100 million.  
                                                 
4
 The laws and regulations concerning China’s OFDI are available from various websites and are 
updated frequently. For a collection of a number of them, see Wolff (2011) and Bernasconi-
Osterwalder, Johnson, and Zhang (2012). 
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In addition, if a project meets any of the following conditions (regardless of its 
size), it needs to be approved by the MOFCOM’s central office, which has to consult 
Chinese embassies or consulates in the host countries concerned:  
• the investment would be undertaken in a country that has not established 
diplomatic relations with China;  
• the investment would be undertaken in a country that is on a blacklist established 
by the MOFCOM and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;  
• the proposed investment would affect the interests of a third country (i.e., beyond 
China and the host country); or  
• an investor plans to set up a special purpose vehicle6 (MOFCOM 2009).  
Lastly, central SOEs that are administered by the SASAC also need to directly 
apply for the Certificate from the MOFCOM regardless of the size of the proposed 
investment or whether any of the above four conditions are met.  
The approval by the central office of the MOFCOM normally takes no longer 
than 20 business days. However, non-natural resource projects7 in which the committed 
investment by a Chinese central SOE is under US$10 million should take no longer than 
three business days for an approval from the central office (MOFCOM 2009).  
Applications for a Certificate for all other projects and enterprises not mentioned 
above are through local departments of commerce, a process that is supposed to take no 
longer than 10 business days. Specifically, all other firms (including both sub-national 
SOEs and non-SOEs) need to obtain a the Certificate from the local Foreign Economic 
Relations and Trade (FERT) offices. There, the approval process is supposed to take not 
more than 20 business days (including five business days for confirmation that an 
application has been received) if any of the following conditions are met:  
• the proposed investment by the Chinese investor(s) would be between US$10 
million and US$100 million; or  
• the proposed investment would be in the oil and mining sectors; or  
• the proposed investment requires additional domestic financing (MOFCOM 
2009).  
All other applications – i.e., OFDI projects by sub-national SOEs and non-SOEs 
where the committed investment by the Chinese investor(s) is below US$10 million – are 
administered by the local FERT offices, and the approval process is stated to take only up 
to three business days (MOFCOM 2009).  
                                                 
6
 A special purpose vehicle is a legal entity created by a sponsor or originator firm by transferring 
assets to the vehicle, to carry out some specific and often temporary purposes or 
circumscribed activities, or a series of such transactions.  
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NDRC Approval Processes 
The NDRC’s role in the current OFDI institutional framework is constituted by three 
documents. First, the NDRC Interim Measures enacted in October 2004 (NDRC 2004). 
Second, its supplementary document released in June 2009, No. [2009]1479 Notice on 
Improving the Administrative Measures of Overseas Investment Projects (hereafter 
NDRC [2009]1479) (NDRC 2009). Third, the NDRC No. 235 Notice on Decentralizing 
the Approval Process of Overseas Investment Projects (hereafter NDRC [2011] 235), 
released in February 2011 (NDRC 2011).  
According to these documents, all investors also need to apply for approval by the 
NDRC or local Development and Reform Commissions (DRCs). OFDI projects in the 
following categories must also be approved directly by the NDRC:  
• the proposed investment is in natural resources and the investment committed by 
the Chinese investor(s) would be over US$300 million;  
• the proposed investment project is not in natural resources, and the investment 
committed by the Chinese investor(s) would be over US$100 million;  
• special projects, including investments in: a country without diplomatic relations 
with China; countries under United Nations sanctions; war zones, as well as 
investment related to infrastructure, telecommunications, cross-border water 
utilization, large-scale land exploitation, electricity networks, and news media 
(NDRC 2004, 2009, 2011).  
The approval process is stated to take not longer than 30 business days: 20 
business days in principle, plus a maximum of 10 business days if an extension is needed 
(NDRC 2004). 
All other projects undertaken by central SOEs are exempted from approval by the 
NDRC. The central office of the NDRC does, however, need to be informed before a 
project is undertaken (NDRC 2004, 2009, 2011). 
The approval of other projects – i.e., those undertaken by sub-national SOEs and 
non-SOEs – is delegated to local DRCs (NDRC 2011). However, the central office of the 
NDRC needs to be informed before local approval is granted if the committed Chinese 
investment is between US$30 million and US$300 million in natural resource industries, 
or between US$10 million and US$100 million in other industries (NDRC 2011). An 
approval criterion of the NDRC, but not of the MOFCOM, is that OFDI projects are 
consistent with China’s national strategic priorities. The NDRC also needs to consult the 
Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council if the target location is in the Taiwan Province 
of China (NDRC, MOFCOM, and Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council 2010). 
Local DRC offices can independently approve other projects below the 




central office of natural resource investment projects between US$30 million and 
US$300 million and non-natural resource investment projects between US$10 million 
and US$100 million (NDRC 2011). 
On 8 June 2009, the NDRC released NDRC [2009]1479 (NDRC 2009), which 
amended the existing approval regulations by adding an article regarding OFDI through 
acquisitions or tenders (both open and private). The article requires Chinese investors to 
provide the NDRC or their provincial DRC offices with detailed information such as the 
investor’s profile, project background, target profiles, due diligence, acquisition or tender 
plans and timelines (NDRC 2009). The NDRC or its provincial equivalents are supposed 
to provide confirmation documents within seven business days (NDRC 2009). 
In an effort to simplify and decentralize its approval process, the NDRC released 
NDRC [2011] 235 on 14 February 2011 (NDRC 2011) and the NDRC Exposure Draft on 
16 August 2012 (NDRC 2012b). The major proposed change is that the investment value 
threshold for approval by the central office of the NDRC is to be raised from US$100 
million to US$300 million for infrastructure and transportation projects, which are 
currently classified as part of non-natural resource projects. Additionally, the NDRC 
Exposure Draft seeks to amend NDRC [2009]1479 by proposing a threshold of US$100 
million, below which no report to the NDRC or its provincial equivalents is required 
(NDRC 2009, 2012b). These changes, if enacted, will expedite the review process. 
The MOFCOM 2009 Measures (MOFCOM 2009) do not mention exemptions to 
the approval process. Similarly, the NDRC Interim Measures (NDRC 2004) as well as 
NDRC [2009]1479 (NDRC 2009) and [2011] 235 (NDRC 2011) do not mention 
exemptions except for central SOEs that meet one of two conditions. First, a central SOE 
will be exempt from approval for OFDI projects in natural resources, transport, and 
infrastructure in which the committed Chinese investment is below US$300 million. 
Second, they will be exempt for OFDI projects in other industries where the committed 
Chinese investment is below US$100 million. For either of these two types of OFDI 
projects, the investing central SOE can take its own investment decision but is required to 
inform the central office of the NDRC (NDRC 2011). In other words, any other OFDI 
proposals of any size and in any area are required to apply for approval by both the 
MOFCOM and the NDRC or their local equivalents. In fact, any agreements or contracts 
signed by a Chinese investor without approval by the MOFCOM and the NDRC are not 
legally binding (NDRC 2004, 2011; MOFCOM 2009).  
SAFE Review Processes 
Chinese investors need to present their OFDI approvals received from the NDRC and the 
MOFCOM before transferring foreign exchange offshore through SAFE for investments 
overseas (SAFE 2009). SAFE is also responsible for examining the sources of the foreign 
exchange in an applicant’s domestic account (SAFE 2009). The amount of the foreign 




NDRC and the MOFCOM. The purchase of foreign exchange to cover pre-investment 
fees8 should not exceed 15% of the total OFDI value (SAFE 2009). If an investment is 
not completed within six months after the remittance of the pre-investment fees, all 
foreign currencies remaining in the overseas banking account for the OFDI project are 
required to be transferred back to the domestic banking account in China (SAFE 2009).  
A Summary 
It is cumbersome, if not redundant, to have two independent ministerial agencies design 
and implement OFDI policies and regulations. This duality creates extra investment costs 
due to overlapping procedures and potential delays due to bureaucracy (e.g., days for 
applicants to figure out who does what). Given that the NDRC is the central machinery 
that designs current and new development policies (including those for the MOFCOM), it 
would be more efficient if the review and approval functions were concentrated in the 
NDRC for both non-SOEs and SOEs, and if such a review were limited to identifying the 
projects that should receive special support. Given the MOFCOM’s unique resources 
associated with its global network of commercial consulate offices, the MOFCOM’s 
functions could be more service-oriented. For instance, it could be dedicated to providing 
information and advice and matchmaking investors to prospective projects. So as not to 
overlap with the NDRC, the function of the SASAC (as principal shareholder of the 
central SOEs) could be limited to ensuring that shareholder interests such as dividends 
and profitability are safeguarded. 
But there is also a broader question. Some 14,000 Chinese firms had established 
nearly 18,000 foreign affiliates abroad as of the end of 2011 (MOFCOM 2012b, 3). As 
Chinese OFDI continues to rise, more firms are becoming outward investors and more 
foreign affiliates will be established. In turn, a growing number of these are likely to 
establish a rising number of their own affiliates abroad. This context means that it may 
simply become impossible to meaningfully review and approve each OFDI project – the 
creation of a huge bureaucracy would be required to undertake this task, otherwise the 
approval system would simply collapse under its own weight (Bath 2011). In fact, even 
now it appears that a number of firms (especially SMEs) invest abroad without formal 
approval, i.e., they manage to elude the approval process altogether. This diminishes the 
ability of the government to direct FDI into the areas that it considers a priority. The 
implication is that sooner or later, the government will have to move to a simplified 
approval regime in which only the largest (or most sensitive) projects will require 
approval, while a simple registration process would suffice for the great majority of 
OFDI projects. 
Approval for Financial Companies 
Chinese financial companies undertaking OFDI need to apply for approval by the NDRC, 
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the People’s Bank of China and their industry regulators. 9  All the NDRC approval 
policies and regulations discussed earlier also apply to Chinese outward investors in the 
financial industries. Between April 1990 and January 2011, The Administrative Measures 
of Financial Enterprises Overseas was the principal regulation guiding outward 
investment by Chinese financial companies (PBC 1990). Since the abolition of that 
regulation in January 2011 (Government of China 2011b), the three financial industry 
regulators have been drafting their own industry-specific administrative measures on 
outward investment by Chinese financial companies. On 22 October 2012, the China 
Insurance Regulatory Commission released its Interim Measures of Investments Overseas 
by Chinese Insurance Companies (CIRC 2012). As of October 2013, no such principal 
regulation on outward investment had been released by either the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission or the China Securities Regulatory Commission.10 Given the 
complexity, flexibility, and vast impact of financial sector investments, greater 
transparency of the guidelines for the other two regulators is desirable. 
Monitoring 
The MOFCOM and the SAFE jointly monitor post-investment activities through, among 
other documents, the Interim Measures for Joint Annual Inspection of Overseas 
Investment (MOFCOM and SAFE 2009).11 The evaluation criteria focus on:  
• economic and financial indicators, including corporate profitability, operational 
performance, asset quality, and solvency;  
• growth potential, for example, market share, sales, labor efficiency; and  
• the economic contribution to China, for example, tax, foreign exchange creation, 
natural resources (MOFCOM and SAFE 2009).  
All the relevant review activities by the MOFCOM, its sub-national equivalents, 
and the SAFE after 2009 have had this document as their policy basis. More recently, the 
MOFCOM has gradually shifted its monitoring from economic and financial indicators to 
include social, environmental and ethical indicators as well. This is a welcome move, 
especially in relation to Chinese firms in developing countries where environmental and 
other regulations (and their implementation) are relatively weak.  
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 I.e., the China Banking Regulatory Commission, the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
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 A detailed list of the policies and regulations of the China Banking Regulatory Commission can 
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An example of this policy expansion is the joint announcement by the MOFCOM 
and the Ministry of Forestry in March 2009 of the Guidebook of Sustainable Operations 
and Exploration of Overseas Forests by Chinese Enterprises (MOFCOM and Ministry of 
Forestry 2009).12  Then, in July 2010, the MOFCOM, the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection’s Chinese Academy for Environmental Planning, and the Global 
Environmental Institute (2010) jointly published a guide entitled Environmental 
Protection Policies on Chinese Investment Overseas to regulate the social and 
environmental behavior of Chinese investors abroad.  
This policy pattern continued in August 2010, when the MOFCOM together with 
a number of other ministries and government agencies 13  issued the Work Safety 
Regulations on Chinese-Invested Enterprises and Organizations Overseas (MOFCOM 
2011). These new regulations seek to protect the 1,220,000 employees working in 
Chinese foreign affiliates, including 888,000 foreign citizens as of the end of 2011 
(MOFCOM 2012a, 5). In May 2012, the MOFCOM jointly released the Opinions on 
Corporate Culture Construction in Chinese Enterprises Overseas together with several 
other ministries and government agencies.14 The object of that document is to promote a 
corporate culture of social responsibility (for instance), and integration with local 
communities and high quality control (MOFCOM 2012b).  
Relatedly, the Banking Regulatory Commission’s Green Credit Guidelines 
require that Chinese banks financing overseas projects monitor and supervise the 
environmental standards observed in the projects they finance (CBRC 2012). Later on, in 
February 2013 the MOFCOM and the Ministry of Environmental Protection (2013) 
issued the Guidelines for Environmental Protection in Foreign Investment and 
Cooperation. More recently, in March 2013 the MOFCOM released the Regulations of 
Behavior in Competition Abroad in the Area of International Investment and 
Cooperation. This proposes to build a credit system that records unethical behavior by 
Chinese enterprises abroad (e.g., bribery, unfair pricing, collusion in bidding, slander, and 
false company reports) (MOFCOM 2013a). 
However, as pointed out by some non-governmental organizations (e.g., the 
World Resources Institute), it remains to be seen how Chinese investors overseas 
interpret these policies and to what extent these guidelines are actually monitored, 
enforced, and sanctioned (Leung, Zhao, Ballesteros, and Hu 2013). One way in which the 
government of China could further extend desirable coporate behavior is by ranking the 
extent to which Chinese MNEs observe standards of corporate social responsibility in 
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 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the NDRC, the Ministry of Public Safety, the State 
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host countries. The behavior of Chinese firms could perhaps be benchmarked against 
international norms, and weak performance in this respect could even be sanctioned. This 
will become even more important as host countries pay greater attention to attracting 
sustainable FDI,15 and in the event that international investment agreements (and their 
dispute settlement procedures) become more sensitive to this issue (Sauvant and Ortino 
2013). At the same time, helping to ensure that MNEs operate correctly abroad is not 
only a challenge for China but for all home countries. 
Central SOEs and their subsidiaries are also subject to special monitoring by the 
SASAC, in line with the Interim Supervision Measures of SOEs’ Investment Overseas 
enacted on 1 May 2012 (SASAC 2012). Through this new policy, the SASAC seeks to 
ensure that the operations of SOEs abroad support China’s economic and social 
objectives and that they are consistent with the objective of transforming China’s 
industrial structure. SOEs are required to report to the SASAC about their internal rules 
governing OFDI. Such internal rules include principles applied to govern their corporate 
affairs, the management team and its responsibilities, the internal process of investment 
decision-making and governance, risk management overseas, investment performance 
assessment and auditing, and key personnel, as well as internal rules for supervising 
OFDI activities. A difference of this policy compared to previous ones is that SOEs are 
not allowed to invest in industries beyond their core businesses (SASAC 2012).  
Given that this new policy strengthens the SASAC’s capacity for scrutiny and its 
regulation procedures, it remains to be seen whether this may slow down future OFDI by 
Chinese SOEs. The management of state assets is a complicated issue in any country, as 
it usually combines both economic concerns (e.g., profitability) with socio-political ones 
(e.g., maintaining employment, supporting domestic development). In any event, the 
management practices of SOEs ought to be transparent, so that host countries can 
understand the benefits that OFDI by SOEs can bring to their economies.  
Investment Promotion 
The Chinese government supports OFDI through financial and fiscal measures, risk 
management, the provision of information, international support through foreign aid, and 
the conclusion of international investment agreements. As mentioned before, the EXIM 
Priorities, the Sector Direction Policy, and the 12th Industrial and FDI Five-Year Plans 
are all important instruments that guide governmental support for OFDI in selective 
foreign industries and projects.  
Financial and Fiscal Support  
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The EXIM and other state-owned commercial banks offer low lending rates, a fast 
approval process, and flexible terms for OFDI projects. For instance, in line with the 
EXIM Priorities, the NDRC and the EXIM established a Special Fund of Lending for 
Investment Overseas to provide credit support for OFDI into priority projects (NDRC and 
EXIM 2003, 2004). Later, in an agreement between the China Development Bank and the 
EXIM in February 2006, special financial services (including discounted leanding rates) 
were extended to:  
• exploration projects for mineral and forestry resources;  
• other projects of benefit to multilateral governmental cooperation; and  
• central SOEs and large-scale business groups that possess sufficient capital, 
technology, management know-how, and brands (CDB and EXIM 2006).  
If lending is in Renminbi (RMB), the discounted lending rates are capped at the 
benchmark rate set by the People’s Bank of China, or at 3% if in a foreign currency (Luo 
et al. 2010). The SAFE has also gradually lifted its limitations on buying foreign 
exchange for OFDI; following the Foreign Exchange Administrative Regulations for 
Domestic Institutions Investing Abroad, no further approval for foreign exchange 
purchases is required by the SAFE once a project and its committed amount of foreign 
exchange are approved by the MOFCOM and the NDRC (SAFE 2009).  
In addition, through a special fund jointly established and managed by the 
Ministry of Finance and the MOFCOM, the Chinese government provides direct 
subsidies to qualifying OFDI projects. Projects that qualify are activities such as: building 
foreign R&D centers and machinery and equipment manufacturing facilities; investments 
in Chinese-built economic and trade zones overseas; and investment in natural 
resources16 (Ministry of Finance and MOFCOM 2012).  
The State Administration of Taxation also provides a series of tax deductions and 
exemptions to support China’s ‘go out’ strategy (SAT 2007). They include, for instance: 
regular deductions and exemptions of both corporate and individual incomes to avoid 
double taxation (SAT 2010); tax reductions for revenues from oil and gas extraction 
overseas by Chinese enterprises (SAT 2011); and a special corporate income tax (reduced 
from a normal tax rate of 25% to 15%) for high-technology enterprises certified by the 
Ministry of Science and Technology (SAT 2011).  
Lastly, in January 2011, the Peoples’ Bank of China introduced and immediately 
started to implement a new foreign exchange policy, viz. OFDI settling accounts in RMB 
(PBC 2011). This allows Chinese firms to mitigate foreign exchange risks by directly 
using RMB to invest abroad if certain conditions are met. The conditions are that the 
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applicant firm should be a registered non-financial enterprise in a province in which 
cross-border trade settlement accounts in RMB are allowed, and the host country must 
allow for settlement of FDI accounts in RMB (PBC 2011). 
Risk Management  
In addition to the protection afforded by the 125 BITs between China and other nations as 
of 1 June 2013 (UNCTAD 2013b) and other international investment agreements, 
Chinese investment overseas may also be able to obtain protection from SINOSURE 
through its various insurance products and services. Enterprises and financial institutions 
that are registered in mainland China and operate there as the principal location of their 
business, as well as financial institutions that provide finance for OFDI by the enterprises 
mentioned above, can apply for investment insurance from SINOSURE. Projects that 
qualify for insurance include new OFDI projects, as well as existing, expanding and 
changing projects. SINOSURE insures against the loss of capital and earnings abroad 
directly caused by expropriation, restrictions on the transfer and conversion of funds, 
damage from war, the inability to operate due to war, and breach of contractual 
undertakings.  
Provision of Information  
Through its global commercial consulate offices, the MOFCOM provides information on 
investment opportunities abroad. Equally important, the Catalogue of Countries and 
Industries for Guiding Investment Overseas (hereafter the Catalogue) provides 
information about the FDI attraction priorities of 127 foreign destinations,17 with a list of 
those industries that are a priority for each host country (NDRC 2007). Many of these 
host country priorities are also shared by China. The Catalogue consists of three parts, 
released in July 2004, October 2005, and January 2007 (NDRC 2007). Continuing and 
expanding this effort, the MOFCOM established the Global Investment and Cooperation 
Information Service System in 2008, which integrates services such as the collection of 
information and statistics and decision-making support (MOFCOM 2013b, 24).18  
In addition, the MOFCOM works with the NDRC and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs to publish the annual OFDI Guidebook of Countries for International Investment 
and Cooperation (hereafter the Guidebook). The Guidebook lists current investment 
opportunities by country, industry, and project, seeking to facilitate OFDI flows. The 
latest version (published on 21 December 2012) covers 165 countries (MOFCOM 
2012d). Indeed, unless this effort is continuously updated, its value will decrease. It is a 
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useful tool that also shows how the Chinese government is keen to encourage OFDI in 
areas that are of priority to host countries, with the side benefit that Chinese investors 
pursuing the investment opportunities might be able to benefit from the various 
incentives that host countries may offer. 
For major natural resource-seeking OFDI projects, the government also serves as 
a leader of Chinese investment consortia (that consist of a number of companies) and 
disseminates information about various investment and cooperation opportunities to the 
members of these consortia as well as others (Li, Newenham-Kahindi, Shapiro, and Chen 
2013). In addition, government agencies like the China Council for the Promotion of 
International Trade conduct annual OFDI surveys of country investment environments 
and build a databank of OFDI intentions by Chinese firms.19 
International Support Through Development Assistance Programs  
China has a relatively long history of overseas development assistance. One such 
assistance program involves the construction of foreign economic and trade cooperation 
zones (FETCZs). Guided by the Chinese government, FETCZs are built to have a 
developed infrastructure, to include a full set of value chains, and to impact other 
industries (Zhang 2011). FETCZs are mostly designated to focus on export processing 
and scientific and technological projects (Zhang 2011). Since 2006, the MOFCOM has 
approved a total of 19 FETCZs; by October 2012, 250 Chinese firms had set up affiliates 
in those zones with US$3.6 billion committed in OFDI and the creation of 17,000 local 
jobs (MOFCOM 2012c). Broadly speaking, there are three types of these zones: 
manufacturing and processing zones in countries like Cambodia, Pakistan, the Republic 
of Korea, Thailand, Venezuela, and Vietnam; resource exploration zones in places such 
as Russia and Zambia; and regional trade zones and assembly zones in countries like 
Egypt, Mauritius, and Russia.  
More broadly, as part of its assistance program China also supports OFDI 
projects, especially in Africa. For example, the Chinese government led a group of 
mining investors to negotiate with local investment bureaus for better investment 
conditions and opportunities in Tanzania (Li et al. 2013). The major policy oriented 
financial institutions are the EXIM and (before it was restructured and corporatized) the 
China Development Bank (Government of China 2008). They provide concessional loans 
subsidized by China’s foreign aid budget. Additionally, the China Development Bank has 
established international cooperative funds with many countries to support Chinese 
operations overseas through concessional loans (Chen 2012). In 2008, the China 
Development Bank was restructured and corporatized as a commercial bank under the 
China Banking Regulatory Commission and thus is no longer a policy bank (Government 
of China 2008). Apart from these concessional loans, China’s aid program also provides 
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aid and no-interest loans for construction and civil development projects (Information 
Office of the State Council 2011). 
International Investment Agreements  
Traditionally, developed countries have concluded international investment agreements 
and free trade agreements (FTAs) with substantial investment provisions to protect the 
investments of their firms abroad and facilitate their operations. Initially, like other 
developing countries, China concluded such agreements primarily to help attract FDI. 
With the rise of the country’s OFDI, however, China also began to look at these 
agreements from the perspective of a home country seeking to protect its investors 
through provisions on national treatment, most-favored-nation treatment, fair and 
equitable treatment, protection from expropriation, and access to international dispute 
settlement.  
As of 1 June 2013, 20  China had more BITs than any other country except 
Germany (125 versus 134) (UNCTAD 2013c). China is negotiating a BIT with the 
United States (‘China-US Strategic’ 2012; Sauvant and Chen 2012) and is considering 
whether to negotiate an international investment agreement with the EU (EU 2010). In 
addition to individual BITs, China is a signatory to investment agreements with groups of 
countries. The most recent (2012) example of this is an agreement with Japan and the 
Republic of Korea,21  covering economies with an aggregate economic weight that is 
similar to that of the members of the North American Free Trade Agreement. China is 
furthermore a signatory to 10 FTAs that contain provisions on investment promotion and 
protection. In addition, China is negotiating FTAs – that if concluded are likely to contain 
investment provisions – with Australia, the Gulf Cooperation Council,22 Iceland, Norway, 
the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), and Switzerland. 
Evaluation of the Current Framework by Chinese Outward Investors  
The previous discussion has provided a comprehensive review of the objectives of the 
OFDI policy regime and the manner in which they have been implemented. To the best of 
our knowledge, there are few independent studies evaluating how successful this policy 
approach has been. However, the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade 
(CCPIT) – one of the oldest and largest Chinese associations to promote international 
trade and outward investment, with more than 68,000 Chinese member firms – has 
undertaken annual surveys of firms that also included questions dealing with OFDI 
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(CCPIT 2012). According to the 2011 survey23 of 333 Chinese firms, the percentage of 
Chinese outward investing firms (regardless of whether state or privately owned) that 
identify China’s ‘go out’ policy as an important or very important factor in their OFDI 
decision-making process did not rise over the 2005 level – in both 2005 and 2011, this 
was stable at 55% of all responses (CCPIT 2012).24  
More interestingly, this percentage (55%) was higher than all other factors 
influencing OFDI decision-making – including the host country’s legal system, and 
natural resources and labor costs – except for the host country’s market size and potential 
(56%). Two more findings are of particular interest as they imply that China’s OFDI 
institutional framework is more important for SOEs than for private enterprises. First, in 
the 2011 survey, the ‘go out’ policy was tied with the host country’s market size and 
potential as the most important factor influencing the OFDI of SOEs (61%). Second, the 
importance of the ‘go out’ policy in OFDI decision-making was greater for SOEs (61%) 
than for private enterprises (53%) (CCPIT 2012). 
The 2011 survey reveals that about 74% of respondents (including both SOEs and 
private enterprises) indicated that they had benefitted from the government’s overall 
OFDI policies. Within the overall policy framework, however, some polices and 
measures are more beneficial than others and their benefits for SOEs and private firms 
tend to be different. Respondents indicated that the four most beneficial policies 
concerned foreign exchange, the simplification of approvals like customs clearance, the 
provision of information on investment opportunities abroad, and risk management 
through protecting the safety of expatriates. More than two thirds of respondents reported 
that they benefited from these four policies (CCPIT 2012).  
However, the OFDI framework seems to be more beneficial for SOEs than private 
enterprises. Eighty three per cent of respondent SOEs in the same survey reported that the 
current OFDI policies are beneficial for their OFDI activities overall, compared to only 
70% of private enterprises. The four most helpful OFDI policies for SOEs were: financial 
and fiscal support through subsidies and special funds; foreign exchange policy support, 
such as simplifying the procedures for purchasing foreign exchange; the provision of 
information on investment opportunities; and the provision of information through the 
Guidebook. For private enterprises, however, the four most helpful policies were: foreign 
exchange policy support; insurance for expatriates; the simplification of approvals such 
as customs clearance; and the provision of information on investment opportunities. The 
common areas pinpointed by both SOEs and private enterprises were foreign exchange 
policy support and the provision of information on investment opportunities. When 
comparing SOEs and private enterprises, more SOEs seemed to be subsidized to 
undertake OFDI and to benefit from the government’s provision of information, but they 
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were also subject to greater restrictions and scrutiny regarding approvals and foreign 
exchange. Private enterprises were relatively more concerned about the protection of their 
expatriates. 
The most recent policy announced and immediately implemented by the NDRC 
may alleviate the de facto policy discrimination against private investors. Noticing the 
rise of OFDI by Chinese private enterprises, in August 2012 the NDRC25 jointly released 
the Implementation Opinions on Encouraging and Guiding Private Enterprises to 
Engage in Investment Overseas (NDRC 2012c). This document laid out five major 
measures, viz. to:  
(1) strengthen the macro-level guidance and coordination for OFDI by private 
enterprises;  
(2) enhance financial and fiscal support for private enterprises, such as loans from 
special international cooperative funds and tax deductions;  
(3) simplify the approval and management measures for OFDI by private firms;  
(4) improve public services for OFDI by private enterprises, such as incubating 
global brands; and  
(5) protect expatriates and foreign assets for private enterprises.  
Another example of the growing attention devoted by the government to private 
enterprise is the creation of the SME International Market Development Fund (hereafter 
SME IMDF) by the Ministry of Finance in 2001 (SME IMDF 2012). Moreover, the 
Guideline for Accelerating the Promotion of International Cooperation and New 
Competitive Advantages (hereafter the Guideline) (NDRC et al. 2012) contains a new 
comprehensive policy directive for promoting all types of international activities by 
Chinese firms. The directive explicitly states that one of the Guideline’s major goals is to 
promote the overseas clustering of Chinese SMEs (NDRC et al. 2012). However, in the 
case of SMEs that hold export licenses and have less than US$45 million in export 
revenues in the year gone by, the SME IMDF could cover up to 70% of the cost of 
selective qualified activities overseas under certain conditions (SME IMDF 2012). Such 
conditions include that the applicants are based in central or western provinces or in 
former north-eastern industrial centers, or the target country is an emerging market (SME 
IMDF 2012). The coverage is up to 50% for other applications (SME IMDF 2012).  
In addition, the SME IMDF (2012) explicitly specifies that priority will be given 
to applicants targeting emerging markets. One of the qualifications for receiving SME 
IMDF support is OFDI-related: the international acquisition of foreign strategic assets 
(e.g., technology, brands) (SME IMDF 2012). Correspondingly, the SAFE released its 
Circular on Encouraging and Prompting Healthy Development of Private Investment 
(2012). There are three consequences of that document. First, there is no more 
registration for foreign exchange repatriation because of a capital reduction or divestment 
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from overseas. Second, the review process for international lending has now been 
simplified. Third, Chinese individuals are allowed to be co-guarantors with Chinese 
enterprises for the international financing of Chinese-owned firms overseas (whereas 
previously, only enterprises could be guarantors). 
Going forward, Chinese investors hope to receive more government support led 
by fiscal incentives. About 70% of respondents in the 2010 CCPIT survey and almost 
half of those in 2009 called for more fiscal incentives for their OFDI activities (authors’ 
estimation based on CCPIT’s raw survey data). In addition, they wanted to see more by 
way of financial incentives, the simplification of procedures, international matchmaking 
opportunities and high quality research in the Guidebooks (authors’ estimation based on 
CCPIT’s raw survey data). While the availability of such support may not determine an 
investment decision, it can make a difference at the margins. And of course, firms always 
welcome whatever support they can obtain from home and host countries. 
4. Challenges Ahead 
This paper has provided a review of China’s regulatory framework that governs the 
country’s OFDI. With significant OFDI beginning only a decade ago, China has rapidly 
become the most important home country among all emerging markets and the third 
largest foreign investor in the world in 2012.26 This growth may well continue in the near 
future, even though it will probably proceed at a slower pace. The rapidity with which 
China has ascended to such an important position has in and of itself focussed 
considerable attention on the growing significance of China in the world FDI market.  
Another facet of China’s OFDI that has attracted attention is that unlike in any 
other important home country, SOEs have so far played a dominant role in the growth of 
Chinese foreign investment although the role of private enterprises is on the rise. In fact,  
a few large central SOEs account for the bulk of China’s OFDI,27 while many small 
private enterprises and sub-national SOEs account for the rest (much of it in 
manufacturing and services). The dominant role of SOEs has, in turn, raised all sorts of 
questions regarding their impact on host countries, an issue that will need careful 
consideration in the future.28  
It is clear that China now has a regulatory framework in place that enables OFDI. 
The overall objectives of this framework are to nurture globally competitive Chinese 
firms and to advance the country’s domestic development. China’s regulatory and 
promotional measures are consistent with these objectives. Improvements are, however, 
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needed in many areas. In particular, the complex and long approval process involving 
two sets of institutions is cumbersome: in the case of financial OFDI, projects need to be 
reviewed by at least one government agency and non-financial OFDI must be reviewed 
by two agencies. This process creates extra costs for outward investing Chinese firms, 
which already need to cope with the liability of foreignness (the extra cost of doing 
business only borne by foreigners), the challenge of being newcomers in the world FDI 
market, and the challenge of the liability of the home country (the extra cost of doing 
business only borne by firms of certain national origins). These kinds of extra costs can 
be crucial when an investment (e.g., a M&A) has to be made in a time-sensitive manner. 
Streamlining the institutional framework is therefore desirable.  
As part of this proposed simplification process, a one-stop shop for OFDI could 
be established to streamline the approval process and bundle together the various support 
measures that are available for outward investors. Moreover, the threshold at which 
approval is required for a given OFDI project could – and should – be raised and 
eventually abolished (at least for the bulk of OFDI projects that are below a certain size). 
Of course, this would diminish the ability of the government to direct FDI in accordance 
with its development priorities. An implication would be that the various incentives the 
government has in place to encourage OFDI in line with its priorities would become more 
important.  
Despite some teething problems, in contrast to the great majority of emerging 
markets, China has a sophisticated array of instruments in place that facilitate, support, 
and encourage OFDI. These instruments include the provision of information, investment 
insurance, financial and fiscal support, linkages to development assistance programs, and 
international investment agreements. Although these instruments are also common in 
other countries, a unique characteristic in the Chinese context is that many of them are 
directed to specific industries and activities in support of the country’s development 
effort. Because of their (historically) larger size and connections with the government, 
SOEs seem to benefit more from these governmental instruments. For example, large 
OFDI projects usually require substantial funds, financial leverage, and risk protection 
through/from domestic financial institutions (most of which are controlled by the central 
government). It is difficult for smaller private enterprises to obtain such support – an 
obstacle they share with SMEs elsewhere.  
Although China is not unique in supporting its firms in their quest to 
internationalize through FDI, only a few countries (such as Singapore) have an economic 
development strategy in place that fully integrates OFDI into it (Sauvant et al. 
Forthcoming). One cannot therefore understand China’s OFDI institutions without 
understanding China’s national development objectives, particularly the promotion of 
industrial transformation. Through scrutiny by the MOFCOM and the NDRC (or their 
local equivalents), China’s government extends special support to FDI projects that make 
a particular contribution to the country’s national development objectives. Achieving 




instance, to encourage the transfer of technology from foreign affiliates back to parent 
companies at home will require that China establishes a stronger regime for enforcing 
intellectual property rights. This is desirable in any event given the growing technological 
and innovatory prowess of Chinese firms. 
The rise of China’s OFDI is creating both threats and opportunities. The principal 
threat is that unwarranted suspicions about this investment and its impact will come to 
dominate the approach by host countries (and particularly developed countries) to  
China’s OFDI. If that threat eventuates, it will be detrimental to both China’s economic 
development and the economic development of host countries, which would forego the 
opportunity of benefitting from the tangible and intangible assets associated with FDI 
from China. It would further be detrimental to the overall integration of China into the 
world economy. China, the host countries of its OFDI, and the world economy at large, 
therefore have an incentive to ensure they have policies in place that allow them to 
minimize any negative effects and maximize the positive effects that spring from the 
rapid rise of China’s OFDI. 
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